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Introduction
Canada is, on the whole, a welcoming place for refu-gees and immigrants, and many deserve this wel-come. Many, but not all. Among the people who
want to come to Canada because of their genuine fear of
persecution in the country of origin or to seek a better life,
there are some whose backgrounds are suspect because they
are serious criminals. Their number is not high; only a small
percentage of them are investigated because of a possible
criminal past.1 However, because of the seriousness of the
allegations (war crimes, genocide, crimes against human-
ity, terrorism, organized crime) and the high-profile, emo-
tionally charged nature of the proceedings dealing with
these allegations, the impact of cases involving criminal
refugee claimants and immigrants goes far beyond their
small number.
While immigration policy has always been international
in outlook, the law underlying this policy has until recently
been much more parochial, regulating access and asylum
primarily from a domestic perspective. This has changed
in the last decade, especially when dealing with criminals.
More and more aspects of international criminal law have
found their way into the Immigration Act, either directly
by reference to international law concepts in its provisions
or indirectly as a result of the jurisprudence of the Federal
Court. This article intends to comprehensively examine the
aspects of international criminal law that have had or will
have an important impact on immigration and refugee law:
the regulation of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, terrorism, and organized crime.
There exists a vast discrepancy, internationally and in
Canada, in the amount of attention given to the crimes
discussed in this article. The approach taken to war crimes
and crimes against humanity has progressed the furthest
in that the prohibition of these crimes has been the subject
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of a comprehensive legal regime and of widespread inter-
national and national enforcement. In contrast, the regu-
lation of terrorist activities has been piecemeal and in re-
sponse to specific crises, with no possibility at the moment
for international adjudication,2 while legally targeting or-
ganized crime internationally is still in its infancy. This dis-
crepancy, which extends in Canada also to the policy level,
finds its reflection in this article, where most of the discus-
sion will be about war crimes and crimes against humanity.
International Crimes: An International Context
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
There have always been war criminals; there have been war
criminals as long as human beings have settled their politi-
cal differences violently rather than peacefully.3 However,
the manner in which society and the international com-
munity have dealt with persons who violated rules estab-
lished for the conduct of war have differed over time.4 The
last century, and especially the last couple of decades, have
seen a remarkable change in attitudes and approaches to-
wards people who commit atrocities such as war crimes
and crimes against humanity.
While this is not the place for detailed discussion of the
varied responses to war criminals (a term used here also
for persons who were involved in genocide and crimes
against humanity, and not only those who violated the rules
of war), it is still useful to point out that since the Nurem-
berg trials after the Second World War, the international
community and individual countries have developed a
number of means to address the terrible turmoil caused by
serious violations of human rights.
Persons who committed war crimes during the Second
World War were initially criminally prosecuted by both the
international military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo,
and by courts in Europe and Asia. This effort essentially
ended by the early sixties, and little more was done until
the eighties, when countries such as Canada, Australia, the
United States, and the United Kingdom renewed their ef-
forts to bring war criminals from that era to justice. Aus-
tralia and the United Kingdom chose the route of criminal
prosecution, while the United States placed its trust in revo-
cation of citizenship and deportation for those who had
gained their citizenship by misrepresenting their activities
during the Second World War. In 1987 Canada decided to
use both approaches.
On the whole it has become clear that in recent times
prosecution of war criminals of the Second War has been
less successful than the remedy of revocation and deporta-
tion. Of the fewer than ten prosecutions attempted in
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom in the last fif-
teen years, only one was successful, in the United Kingdom
in 1999.5 The success rate for the revocation/deportation ap-
proach has been much higher,6 especially in the United States.
The response to war crimes committed since the Sec-
ond World War covers an even larger spectrum. There have
been criminal investigations or prosecutions in Europe
against the perpetrators of war crimes in Yugoslavia and
the genocide in Rwanda; countries such as Switzerland,
Germany, Denmark, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
come to mind. Other countries have started criminal pro-
ceedings against their own nationals who had been involved
in crimes against humanity against fellow citizens during
earlier regimes; Ethiopia has established the office of the
special prosecutor for crimes committed during the
Mengistu regime; Rwanda is trying tens of thousands of
persons involved in the 1994 genocide; and in Chile the way
has been cleared to prosecute Augusto Pinochet.
Internationally, the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia
and Rwanda resulted in action by the United Nations Se-
curity Council, which set up specialized tribunals to ap-
portion justice to the principal actors in these conflicts.
These tribunals are the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (icty) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ictr). There have been calls for
other international tribunals to address crimes against hu-
manity committed in places such as Cambodia, East Timor,
and Sierra Leone.
A major step internationally in pursuing war criminals
has been the Statute of the International Criminal Court
of July 17, 1998,7 which gives the International Criminal
Court jurisdiction to hear cases involving genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity without the territo-
rial limitations now associated with the icty and ictr. The
Statute will come into force when sixty countries have rati-
fied it, likely within the next couple of years.8
Still within the realm of criminal remedies have been
two important developments in extradition law, both of
which have to do with immunity for heads of state. Tradi-
tionally, heads or ex-heads of state cannot be prosecuted
or extradited anywhere for any crime committed while
functioning as head of state. An exception has now been
made by the British House of Lords in the Pinochet case,9
and by the icty when it indicted Yugoslav President
Milosevic.10 In both situations—that of former head of state
Pinochet and of Milosovic, who was head of state at the
time of indictment—it has now been accepted that immu-
nity cannot be invoked when the crime is genocide, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity. The result of these two
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developments has been that some (ex-) heads of state have
considered it prudent not to leave their countries for fear
of extradition requests.11 As well, in the Pinochet situation,
Argentina and a number of European states, apart from
Spain which initiated the original request for his extradi-
tion, also wanted him for trial in their countries.
A number of other, non-criminal, remedies are being
employed to make life difficult for war criminals. Provi-
sions in the immigration and refugee laws of European
countries, Canada, Australia, and the United States are good
examples of resorting to civil means to obtain some vindi-
cation for the victims of human rights abuses. However,
these provisions and their effectiveness vary widely from
country to country. Another course of action is pursued in
the United States where perpetrators of atrocities must pay
compensation to their victims.12
Last, a number of countries have confronted the past
using an entirely different means: the route of truth and
reconciliation commissions. They preferred a more con-
textual approach as opposed to bringing to justice a lim-
ited number of individuals. The best known are such com-
missions in South America (Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argen-
tina in the eighties, and Chile in the nineties), Latin America
(El Salvador and Guatemala in the nineties) and Africa
(Uganda and Zimbabwe in the eighties, Chad, South Af-
rica, and Rwanda in the nineties, and even more recently
in Nigeria and possibly Sierra Leone), although there has
also been such work done in the Philippines and Germany.13
Finally, sometimes more than one remedy has been
employed to deal with atrocities. The Rwandan genocide re-
sulted in the establishment of an international tribunal, pros-
ecutions of its own nationals by Rwanda, prosecutions by other
countries, deportations, transfers to the ictr tribunal, and a
truth and reconciliation commission. At the moment there
are discussions about creating a mixed international/do-
mestic tribunal in Sierra Leone, while also examining the
possibility of a truth and reconciliation commission as well.
Genocide
While the international community has been the most ac-
tive since the Second World War in dealing with war crimi-
nals,14 other serious criminal activities have also been the
subject of international regulation and enforcement. The
most important of these are the crimes of genocide, ter-
rorism, organized crime, and torture.15
While the crime of genocide has been the subject of an
international convention since 1948 and found to be part
of customary international law by the International Court
of Justice in 1951,16 no prosecutions of perpetrators of this
crime occurred until 1996 when the ictr charged Mr.
Akeyesu17 with this crime in the context of the 1994 geno-
cide in Rwanda. Both the icty and ictr have now used the
genocide provision to lay charges against individuals in-
volved in the Bosnian and Rwandan conflicts,18 as have a
number of European countries. Germany has been particu-
larly successful, with four convictions so far.
Terrorism
Terrorism has been used as a political tool to change the
behaviour of governments for over a century, but only in
the last couple of decades has it become the subject of trea-
ties that held individuals liable under international law.
Since 1968, several forms of terrorism have been prohib-
ited by widely accepted international conventions: hijack-
ing;19 unlawful acts of violence at airports;20 crimes against
internationally protected persons;21 hostage taking;22 crimi-
nals acts in relation to the physical protection of nuclear
materials;23 and unlawful acts against the safety of mari-
time navigation, including fixed platforms located on the
Continental Shelf.24 The United Nations General Assem-
bly approved a resolution on December 15, 1997, to adopt
the International Convention for the Suppression of Ter-
rorist Bombings,25 which penalizes bombing (which is de-
fined) outside the state of which the perpetrator is a na-
tional. Most recently, the United Nations General Assem-
bly also approved a resolution on December 9, 1999, to
adopt the International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Financing.26
All these activities are considered terrorism, no matter
who committed them, and no matter whether the acts were
committed against a person’s own government, a foreign
government, or even against persons without connection
to any government. The acts themselves are considered so
reprehensible that they should be forbidden no matter what
the context. Apart from these specific activities it has been
impossible to agree on a definition of terrorism acceptable
to the entire international community.27
In 1991 the International Law Commission of the United
Nations unsuccessfully attempted to define terrorism (“acts
against another state directed at persons or property and
of such a nature as to create a state of terror in the minds
of public figures, groups of persons or the general public”).28
As well, a resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations29 states the following, which could be a use-
ful and contemporary description of terrorism (in para-
graph 1 and 2):
1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of ter-
rorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whom-
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ever committed; 2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes
are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the consid-
erations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them;
There is no international body to prosecute persons who
have been involved in terrorist activities. Only individual
states take legal action against alleged terrorists, by pros-
ecuting them, extraditing them, or applying immigration
remedies against them.30
Organized Crime
In addition to a number of international and regional po-
litical initiatives undertaken by many countries to combat
organized crime, there have also been major inroads made
on the international legislative front. As a result of the 1994
World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational
Crime in Naples,31 the General Assembly of the United
Nations adopted on November 15, 2000, the United Na-
tions Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
and its two protocols, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Mi-
grants by Land, Sea and Air.32
As with terrorism, only national enforcement action is
possible.
Serious Criminality: The Canadian Immigration
Legislation
The main provisions in the present Immigration Act for
the types of serious criminality that have been the subject
of consideration in the international community—geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, terrorism, and
organized crime—can be found in the portion that regu-
lates the admissibility of persons to Canada.
The prohibition against persons involved in organized
crime is set out in subparagraph 19(1)(c.2) of the Act and
indicates that membership in an organization that has a
pattern of criminality leads to a finding of inadmissibility;
both present and past membership is covered by this section.33
The inadmissibility provisions for terrorism can be
found in four subparagraphs, which together make a wide
range of terrorist activity subject to scrutiny: any commis-
sion of terrorist activities carried out personally or as a
member of a terrorist organization, whether these activi-
ties were done in the past or the present or will happen in
the future. The operative sections are 19(1)(e)(iii),
19(1)(e)(iv)(C), 19(1)(f)(ii), and 19(1)(f)(iii)(B).34
Ensuring that persons who have been involved in geno-
cide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity cannot en-
ter Canada or, if they are in Canada, will be removed, is the
subject of three provisions in the Act: subsections 19(1)(j),
19(1)(l), and 19(1.1). Subsection 19(1)(j) deals with persons
who have been involved in such crimes directly or indi-
rectly,35 while the combination of subsections 19(1)(l)36 and
19(1.1)37 goes further and makes inadmissible any high offi-
cial of a regime that the Minister of Citizenship and Immi-
gration has designated as a regime that was or is engaged
in terrorism, genocide, war crimes, or crimes against hu-
manity. So far, seven regimes have been designated:
• the Bosnian Serb regime between March 27, 1992, and
October 10, 1996 (designated June 16, 1993, later ex-
tended on August 15, 1997)
• the Siad Barré regime in Somalia between 1969 and
1991 (designated October 12, 1993)
• the military governments in Haiti between 1971 and
1986, and between 1991 and 1994, except the period
August–December 1993 (designated April 8, 1994)
• the former Marxist regimes of Afghanistan between
1978 and 1992 (designated October 21, 1994)
• the governments of Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr and
Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq since 1968 (desig-
nated September 3, 1996)
• the government of Rwanda under President
Habyarimana between October 1990 and April 1994,
as well as the interim government in power between
April and July 1994 (designated April 27, 1998)
• the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via and the Republic of Serbia (under Milosevic) since
February 28, 1998 (designated June 30,1999)38
It is not necessary to show that the persons were involved
in all the activities described above, but only that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that they were. The standard of
proof of reasonable grounds is low: between mere suspi-
cion and balance of probabilities.39 On the other hand, in
order not to cast the net so wide that persons who have been
on the periphery of organizations involved in nefarious ac-
tivities are caught, all of these provisions, except subsec-
tion 19(1)(j), contain so-called exemption clauses that allow
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to overcome
the inadmissibility and allow landing or entry if the Minis-
ter judges it not to be detrimental to the national interest.
The Immigration Act does not address only terrorism,
organized crime, genocide, war crimes, and crime against
humanity in the context of admissibility. These concepts
permeate all aspects of the processes set out in the Act.40
They can be found in the provisions dealing with eligibil-
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ity to refer a claim to the Convention Refugee Determina-
tion Division (crdd) of the Immigration and Refugee
Board,41 appeal rights to the Immigration Appeal Division
(iad),42 landing of refugees,43 access to the Post-Determi-
nation Refugee Claimant in Canada (pdrcc) process,44 re-
moval from Canada,45 and the provisions regulating the
special security proceedings and protection of informa-
tion.46 They also play a role in the humanitarian and com-
passionate (h&c) process.47
Serious criminality is also a factor for refugee determi-
nation as a result of the Schedule to the Immigration Act
that incorporates exclusion clauses E and F of the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention. Exclusion ground F, which deals with
criminality, does not allow persons who have been involved
in crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, serious non-political crimes, and acts against the prin-
ciples and purposes of the United Nations to obtain refu-
gee status.
Serious Criminality: The Canadian Immigration
Jurisprudence
Terrorism
The courts in Canada have been as reluctant as the inter-
national community to define the term terrorism, which is
used in subparagraphs 19(1)(e)(iii), 19(1)(e)(iv)(C),
19(1)(f)(ii), and 19(1)(f)(iii)(B)48 of the present Immigra-
tion Act. Instead of providing a definition, both the Appeal
and the Trial Divisions of the Federal Court, in the Suresh
case, and the Federal Court of Appeal in the Ahani49 case,
make a number of propositions about terrorism:
• There is no need to define the term. “When one sees
a ‘terrorist act,’ one is able to define the word.”
• The term in not vague or imprecise. The term is de-
fined in a dictionary as “using terror and violence to
intimidate, subjugate, etc. especially as a political
weapon or policy.”
• The term terrorism or terrorist act must receive a wide
and unrestricted interpretation.
• In general, attacks on civilians are terrorist attacks.
• Those who freely choose to raise funds to sustain ter-
rorist organizations bear the same guilt and respon-
sibility as those who actually carry out the terrorist
acts. Persons who raise funds for the purchase of
weapons, which they know will be used to kill civil-
ians, are as blameworthy as those who actually pull
the triggers.
• Terrorism includes the act of assassination directed
at silencing political dissidents who seek to bring
about change through the exercise of free expression.50
Membership
The notion of “membership,” which is used not only in
some sections of the Immigration Act described above,51
but has also received judicial interpretation in the context
of exclusion ground F(a),52 has been given the following
parameters:
• To be a member of an organization, formal member-
ship is not required. Simply belonging to such an or-
ganization is sufficient.
• An individual is a member of an organization if one
devotes oneself full time or almost full time to the
organization, or if one is associated with members of
the organization, especially for a lengthy period of
time.
• Belonging to an organization is assumed when peo-
ple join voluntarily and remain in the group for the
common purpose of actively adding their personal
efforts to the group’s cause.53
• There is no need to identify the specific acts in which
the individual has been involved because of the no-
toriety and singular purpose of the group.
• Knowledge of the purpose of the organization can be
imputed from the activities one is involved in and is
presumed if one belongs to this type of organization.
This presumption can be rebutted.54
Organized Crime
The section dealing with organized crime has not yet re-
ceived any judicial interpretation with respect to the sub-
stantive terms used in section 19(1)(c.2)55 although several
judicial review applications that challenged the refusal or
removal based on this section have been dealt with by the
court on other grounds.56
Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity
General
The vast majority of the case-law that the Federal Court
developed in the area of serious criminality has been in the
area of complicity for crimes against humanity for exclu-
sion ground F(a). The court has decided over eighty cases
dealing with F(a) matters since 1992, primarily to deter-
mine where to lay the boundaries for liability of persons
who had not personally committed such atrocities.57
Apart from the contribution by the Federal Court to
international law in war crimes and crimes against human-
ity in the area of complicity, most substantive law dealing
with the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity has been generated by the icty, the ictr,58 and
the negotiations surrounding the Statute of the Interna-
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tional Criminal Court.
The development of crimes under international law has
not always taken place consistently. As a result, there is over-
lap between a number of crimes, such as between geno-
cide and crimes against humanity; war crimes and crimes
against humanity; crimes against humanity and terrorism;
and war crimes and terrorism.
These crimes can be described as follows:
• Genocide: the deliberate and systematic destruction,
in whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group, whether committed in times of peace
or in times of war, by state officials or by private indi-
viduals.
• Crimes against humanity: murder, extermination,
enslavement, torture, and any other inhumane acts
committed against civilians, in a widespread or sys-
tematic manner, whether or not the country is in a
state of war, and regardless whether the act is in vio-
lation of the territorial law in force at the time. The
acts may have been committed by state officials or
private individuals, and against their own nationals
or nationals of other states.
• War crimes: criminal acts committed during interna-
tional armed conflicts (war between states) and civil
wars, which violate the rules of war as defined by in-
ternational law. These acts include the ill-treatment
of civilian populations within occupied territories, the
violation and exploitation of individuals and private
property, and the torture and execution of prisoners.
Differences between genocide and crimes
against humanity
Historically, genocide was considered a particularly repre-
hensible crime against humanity, and as a result every geno-
cide is still also a crime against humanity; the reverse is not
true, however. The difference between genocide and crimes
against humanity is as follows:
• The intention for genocide is narrower, namely an
“intent to destroy,” while for crime against humanity
it is “knowledge of an attack.”
• The behaviour targeted for genocide is more repre-
hensible, namely the destruction “in whole or in part,
of a group,” while for crimes against humanity, it is
“widespread or systematic attack.”
• The circle of victims for genocide is narrower, namely
“a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group,” as
opposed to “any civilian population” for crimes
against humanity.59
Differences between war crimes and crimes against
humanity
Traditionally, the difference between these two crimes was
easier to identify.
War crimes could be committed only during a time of
war between two countries. They could be committed only
against persons who were nationals of the opposite side of
the conflict. On the other hand, someone could commit a
war crime even it was done as an isolated incident and even
if the perpetrator was acting in an individual (and not based
on state authority) capacity.
Crimes against humanity could be committed against
any national but only as part of a widespread or systematic
policy, action, or plan, and only if connected to the com-
mission of a war crime by individuals acting on behalf of a
state.
As a result of the fact that international law now includes
as war crimes acts committed during non-international
armed conflicts, and the fact that the requirements of the
connection to a war and acting on behalf of a state have
been eliminated in the concept of crimes against human-
ity, the lines between those crimes have become blurred.
There are still some differences, however:
• Isolated reprehensible acts do not amount to crimes
against humanity, while even one atrocity can result
in the commission of a war crime. This does not mean
that a single act can never be a crime against human-
ity, but it has to be shown that this one act was the
result of the implementation of widespread or sys-
tematic policy.
• War crimes, even committed in a civil war, can occur
only when a certain threshold of intensity has been
reached between the two parties in this conflict. For
instance, the actions of police officers conducting
themselves violently during riots do not amount to
war crimes. Crimes against humanity can occur in
any setting: international wars, civil wars, and even
in times of peace. This would mean that a particular
activity, for instance a killing of a civilian during a
civil war, could be both a war crime and a crime
against humanity if the other requirements of each
crime were fulfilled.
• While some of the enumerated prohibited acts can
be both war crimes and crimes against humanity,
other acts fall under one category only. For example,
destruction of certain types of property can be a war
crime but can never be a crime against humanity,
while persecution is a crime against humanity but not
a war crime.
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Differences between crimes against humanity/war
crimes and terrorist acts
International law has determined that only certain narrowly
defined activities amount to terrorism, although a recent
agreement, the International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Terrorist Bombings, has a wider application and
penalizes bombings in public places, government facilities,
public transportation systems, or infrastructure facilities.
War crimes and crimes against humanity cover most of
these terrorist activities but also include others that are not
considered terrorism.
On the other hand, terrorist acts can occur in a context
wider than crimes against humanity, since they need not
be committed in a widespread or systematic manner and
can be committed against persons and property. They are
also wider in this context than war crimes because they
can be committed both in time of war and peace. As with
the overlap between war crimes and crimes against human-
ity, it is possible that one activity can fit the description of
all three crimes at the same time, for instance where a per-
son belongs to a group that has conducted a bombing cam-
paign during a civil war.
War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes against
Humanity: The Canadian Policy
The Canadian policy is based on two distinct but related
elements. The first one is that Canada will not be a safe
haven for persons who have been involved in atrocities
abroad. The second element is that in pursuing such per-
sons, Canada will abide by its international obligations.
The no safe haven policy was most recently articulated
as follows: “The message is clear. Those individuals who
have committed a war crime, a crime against humanity or
any other reprehensible act during times of conflict, re-
gardless of when or where these crimes occurred, are not
welcome in Canada.”60
In international law, states incur obligations from the
operation of conventional or customary international law.
In conventional international law, the instruments that are
applicable are the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols, the Genocide Convention, Torture Convention,
and the “terrorism” conventions, the last two insofar as the
activities mentioned in these conventions can also amount
to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Crimes against
humanity finds its source in customary international law.
The four Geneva Conventions61 are primarily directed
towards international armed conflict, that is, armed conflict
between two High Contracting Parties or situations of occu-
pation of territories. The Conventions can also apply to non-
international armed conflicts where the parties to the conflict
have agreed to apply the provisions of the Conventions.
The four Geneva Conventions contain similar defini-
tions of grave breaches or war crimes, that is, serious
breaches of the obligations under the Conventions, and
require High Contracting Parties to take the following
measures with respect to grave breaches:
• enact legislation to provide penal sanctions for per-
sons committing (or ordering to be committed) any
of the grave breaches of the Convention
• search for persons alleged to have committed such
grave breaches
• bring such persons, regardless of their nationality,
before their own courts
On the last point, if the state prefers, it may, “in accordance
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons
over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting party has made out a prima
facie case.” This is the basis for what is known as the prosecute
or extradite provision of the Geneva Conventions.
Additional Protocol i, Article 88, imposes on High Con-
tracting Parties the obligation to provide the greatest meas-
ure of assistance in connection with criminal proceeding
brought in relation to grave breaches of the Conventions
or of the Protocol. States are required to co-operate in ex-
tradition and consider the extradition request of the State
in whose territory the alleged offence has occurred.
While there is no positive obligation on State Parties to
the Genocide Convention to prosecute persons accused of
committing genocide unless the genocide was committed
in the State’s territory, there is a positive obligation on States
Parties to grant an extradition request “in accordance with
their laws and treaties.”
In addition to being covered by the grave breaches pro-
visions of the Geneva Conventions, the prohibition against
torture is also covered by the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. This convention applies during times of
armed conflict, as well as during times of peace.
The convention places an obligation on State Parties to
make acts of torture offences under their criminal law and,
if persons alleged to have committed such offences are
found on the State’s territory, without exception and
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory,
must submit the case to its competent authorities for pros-
ecution or extradition.
At the moment, there are eleven conventions that regu-
late terrorism and to which Canada is a party.62 They all
contain a duty to extradite or prosecute, of which the latter
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is expressed as follows: “The Contracting State in the terri-
tory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does
not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatso-
ever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take
their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that
State.”
Although it is argued that there is a general duty to pros-
ecute or extradite those accused of crimes against human-
ity, there is no convention that covers crimes against hu-
manity stating this. Therefore, one must look to custom-
ary international law to determine whether there exists an
obligation to extradite or prosecute persons who have com-
mitted crimes against humanity.
Although Canada is not party to the Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity,63 this Convention could be
considered, in some respects, to be an expression of cus-
tomary international law. The Convention does not con-
tain a prosecute or extradite provision but reflects the gen-
eral obligation on States to extradite those accused of war
crimes in accordance with international law. There are also
two United Nations General Assembly Resolutions that deal
with the issue of war crimes and crimes against humanity
in this context. The first one is the 1970 un Resolution on
War Criminals,64 which refers only to extradition in the
same general terms as the convention mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. The second is the 1973 un Resolu-
tion on Principles of International Co-operation in the
Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.65 This
resolution states that war crimes or crimes against human-
ity, wherever committed, are subject to investigation and
prosecution. Although it states that, as a general rule, pros-
ecution should occur in the countries in which the offences
were committed, it does not exclude prosecution in other
countries. There is no explicit prosecute or extradite pro-
vision, but there is a call for cooperation among states in
the prosecution of such crimes. Furthermore, whether un
General Assembly resolutions constitute customary inter-
national law is a controversial issue among international
legal scholars and not free from doubt by any means.
The statutes of the two International Criminal Tribu-
nals, established by the un Security Council and thus bind-
ing on all states, do not contain prosecute or extradite pro-
visions for alleged criminals within their jurisdiction. There
are, however, obligations on States to cooperate with the
Tribunals in the investigation and prosecution of accused
persons, as well as the obligation to transfer accused per-
sons to the Tribunals.66 The same will apply to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court when its Statute comes into force.67
The following conclusions that underlie Canada’s policy
on international obligations can be drawn from the above:
• There is a duty to extradite or prosecute persons who
have committed war crimes during international
armed conflicts.
• There is also a duty to extradite persons who have
committed genocide.
• Likewise, there is a duty to transfer persons who com-
mitted war crimes or crimes against humanity in the
former Yugoslavia since 1991, or in Rwanda in 1994,
to the International Criminals Tribunals established
for this purpose.
• There is at the moment no positive legal obligation
to prosecute or extradite people who have commit-
ted war crimes during non-international armed con-
flicts or who have committed crimes against human-
ity unless:
 these same acts also amount to torture
 these acts fall within the definitions of the “terror-
ism” conventions
In order to implement the two elements of the Cana-
dian policy, three departments have created war crimes sec-
tions. The rcmp and the Department of Justice have had
such sections since 1987 but have dealt primarily with al-
leged war criminals from the Second World War era, until
recently when they also expanded into the investigation for
possible prosecution of persons involved in modern-day
war crimes—those atrocities committed since wwii. The
Department of Citizenship and Immigration established a
war crimes section only in 1996, and its mandate is limited
to applying immigration remedies, such as overseas refusal,
exclusion, refusal of landing and deportation to modern-
day war criminals.68
The war crimes sections of the three departments have
developed a modus operandum that brings together effi-
ciently and coherently the two elements of the Canadian
war crimes policy. All allegations received by the three de-
partments are examined by an operations group with mem-
bers of these three sections. This operations group has been
and will be making an assessment of each individual alle-
gation to determine whether the allegation should be in-
vestigated by the rcmp/Justice for possible prosecution, or
by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in or-
der to apply immigration remedies. If the allegation dis-
closes a possible war crime, genocide, a terrorist activity,
or torture, the file is automatically referred to the rcmp/
Justice. If the allegation discloses a crime against human-
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ity the file is not automatically referred, but a further ex-
amination is conducted to assess the seriousness of the
crimes against humanity and only for the most serious ones
the rcmp/Justice will open their own file. So far, over 800
allegations of atrocities have been examined by the inter-
departmental operations group, of which about 10 per cent
were referred to the rcmp/Justice.69
Referral of an allegation is only one step in the co-
operative effort of the three war crimes sections to imple-
ment the war crimes policy. If a file has been referred from
cic, cic will continue processing the file up to the point of
removal; if a person can be removed but is also the subject
of a rcmp/Justice investigation, the operations group will
make an ad hoc decision on how to proceed with that par-
ticular file at that time, taking into account such factors as
the state of the criminal investigation versus allowing a
person who has been determined to be a war criminal un-
der the immigration system to remain in Canada. On the
other hand, a referral to the rcmp/Justice will not neces-
sarily result in the laying of criminal charges; most cases
that are referred arise out of allegations or evidence that
are not admissible in criminal court, so that other corrobo-
rative evidence needs to be found to support the case. If
diligent investigative efforts have been made and there is
still insufficient evidence to lay charges, the file is referred
to cic in order to use immigration remedies against the
subject of these allegations.
This system ensures that Canada’s international obliga-
tions to investigate and prosecute persons who have been
involved in atrocities are respected without compromising
the policy of zero tolerance for war criminals, by using other
immigration remedies if it is not possible or necessary to
utilize the extradition or prosecution option, thereby pre-
venting Canada from becoming an attractive place for hu-
man rights abusers to hide.70
Bill c-31 and Its Impact
On April 6, 2000, the government introduced Bill c-31 to
replace the present Immigration Act entirely and permit
the immigration and refugee system to be more responsive
to the needs and challenges of the future.71 The underlying
premise of the Bill was to open the front door to genuine
immigrants and refugees but close the back door to per-
sons who do not need or who abuse Canada’s immigrant
and refugee system.
The Bill did not contain any additional provisions that
specifically deal with war criminals.72 For the most part, all
the provisions that deal with war criminals, which have been
effective in the present Immigration Act, were been trans-
ferred to the Bill. In a number of instances, the Bill con-
tained sections that had application to suspected war crimi-
nals as well as to other categories of persons involved in
very serious criminality, such as organized crime or terror-
ism. The purpose of these sections was to streamline some
of the processes that are often cumbersome and lengthy, as
well as to eliminate the distinctions in the immigration
processes that now exist between organized crime, terror-
ism, and war crimes.73
Some of these new provisions ensured that:
• access to the iad was prohibited entirely for all seri-
ous criminals74
• exclusion was extended from the notion of refugees
to the new concept in the Bill of persons in need of
protection75
• persons whose refugee claim had been refused by the
crdd could not enter the refugee stream again; this
would have included persons who had been excluded
for the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. At the moment, it is possible for persons
who have been rejected to make subsequent claims76
• it would no longer have been necessary to have the Min-
ister of Citizenship and Immigration declare that it is
contrary to the national interest to deny access to the
crdd to people involved in very serious criminality; an
inadmissibility finding that a person belonged to such a
category would have been is sufficient for this purpose77
• the threshold for removing persons to their country
of origin who have been found to be refugees but also
have committed very serious criminal activities was
changed from “danger to security of Canada” to ei-
ther “danger to the security of Canada or “contrary
to the national interest”78
• for the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, the Minister
would have taken into account (when considering an
application for protection from persons who were
serious criminals or who were excludable) whether
such persons would pose a “danger to the security of
Canada” or if it would be contrary to the national
interest to allow such an application79
Conclusion
The last decade has seen a trend towards international
criminalization of a number of activities that the global
community has come to view as reprehensible from a moral
point of view while at the same time politically highly
destabilizing. A concerted effort has taken place to address
these activities by developing international legal instru-
ments as well as enforcement mechanisms. The result is
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uneven. On the war crimes front, which includes genocide
and crimes against humanity, there has been real progress
in bringing the law into accordance with the political real-
ity of civil wars and the wide abuse of human rights, at the
same time as the international community and individual
states have started to enforce those legal norms. The situa-
tion with terrorism and organized crime is different, for
now there are a number of international treaties of which
the most recent ones against terrorism and the ones per-
taining to organized crime could have a large impact, but
for the moment have limited application, namely only when
individual states are willing to act. It has not yet been pos-
sible to develop an international enforcement mechanism
to deal with these two types of crimes.
Canada’s experience mirrors the international one. In
the area of war crimes and crimes against humanity, both
the judiciary and the Canadian government have devel-
oped a sophisticated model for dealing with persons in-
volved in such crimes. The Federal Court jurisprudence in
the area of complicity for crimes against humanity gave a
wide interpretation to exclusion ground F(a)80 and was
ahead of—although not at odds with—international law,81
while the government has developed a method of ensur-
ing that all allegations of war crimes are dealt with appro-
priately, either by prosecution or immigration remedies.
The Federal Court has also been willing to freely inter-
pret certain concepts related to terrorism and organized
crime but has avoided tackling the most vexing issue—a
definition of the term terrorism itself. And it has not been
necessary for the government to determine which law to
apply—criminal or civil—for such activities, since the con-
ventions with the most impact—the latest two terrorist
conventions and the organized crime convention—have
not yet been ratified by Canada.
It would appear that when taking together all the seri-
ous criminal activities discussed, the major sources of in-
vestigations are persons applying abroad and refugee claim-
ants in Canada. In Canada a number of processes are used
for refugee claimants or refugees against whom there are
allegations of serious criminality. In the immigration con-
text, not only is exclusion clause F used but also the non-
eligibility provisions, if they are claimants, while refusal of
landing, denial of appeal rights, and reliance on the
refoulement provisions are levelled against them if they have
obtained refugee status. Some of them are also investigated
for criminal purposes if they had a connection to geno-
cide, war crimes, and torture, or if their activities related to
crimes against humanity have been particularly heinous.
In using immigration remedies to bring war criminals
to justice, Canada is trying to adhere to all its international
obligations, which sometimes are not easy to reconcile. A
good example is the double obligation in the Torture Con-
vention, one that contains a positive duty to prosecute or
extradite a person who might have been involved in acts of
torture,82 while the second, a negative one, prohibits
refoulement to torture.83 Both provisions could very well
apply to a refugee claimant who is excluded because of in-
volvement in torture, and who is then investigated unsuc-
cessfully by the rcmp/Justice for possible criminal charges
because there is not sufficient evidence to meet the much
higher burden in a criminal trial. A decision needs then to
be made whether this person should be removed to his
country of origin while he has raised the prospect of being
tortured upon his return there. These are the cases for which
there is no easy answer but where the government, aca-
demics, and non-governmental organizations can work
together to bring about an acceptable solution for all con-
cerned, but especially for the victims of such a person who
might also be living in Canada and whose past agony will
revive if they come eye to eye with their torturer.84
It will become necessary to ensure that persons involved
in very serious criminality are taught that their crimes do
not pay. One way of doing this is to have a system in which
similar to national criminal law systems, perpetrators are
investigated and then taken to justice. Whether they are
brought to justice by the international community or by
the courts and tribunals of individual countries matters
less than the fact that perpetrators know that at some point
in the future their actions will have consequences and that
they will not be able to continue to do their deeds with
impunity. What does matter in this war against impunity
is the effectiveness of the remedies employed. Although is
quite arguable that deporting a serious criminal to his or
her country of origin might not be seen as a real solution
in the bigger question of providing a deterrent, exacting
retribution, or compensating the victims, like other efforts
made in this area in the last decade, it is a first and impor-
tant step to show possible perpetrators that their lives will
not be made easy when trying to come to Canada.
If Canada’s example of a combination of immigration
remedies with the likelihood of criminal prosecution for
cases with sufficient evidence to prosecute—as is now the
case for persons involved in war crimes or crimes against
humanity—will have resonance in the future in other coun-
tries and will result in similar action taken elsewhere, one
hopes that the world will become a smaller place for hu-
man rights abusers and other serious criminals to commit
their reprehensible activities unchecked.
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1. See Canada’s War Crimes Program, Annual Report 1999-2000,
Appendix F (see cic website at <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
pub/war2000-e.html>). The number of refugee claimants in-
vestigated between 1992 and 2000 for atrocities is 2940; inter-
vention for exclusion F(a) was sought by the Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration in 356 cases; of these cases in which
the Minister intervened, the Convention Refugee Determina-
tion Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board excluded
a person 225 times. While this number is only in relation to
exclusion clause F(a), this clause is used by far the most of all
the exclusion clauses. For instance, at the Federal Court level,
there have been over 80 cases decided in respect to F(a) (or
F(c) cases dealing with crimes against humanity) between 1992
and 2001, while there have only been only 7 F(b) and 6 other
F(c) cases at that level.
2. An attempt was made to include this crime in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court but it was unsuccessful; see note
30 for more details.
3. See for instance Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds., Crimes of
War, What the Public Should Know (New York & London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1999).
4. See Christopher Greenwood, “Historical Development and Le-
gal Basis” in Dieter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian
Law in Armed Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)
12-23.
5. Namely the Sawoniuk case. For a commentary, see Ian Bryan
and Peter Rowe, “Role of Evidence in War Crimes Trial: The
Sawoniuk Case” in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law
2, 1999: 307-323. Another case, Serafimovich, was not success-
ful. Canada launched four cases between 1985 and 1990; they
were the cases of Finta, Pawlowski, Reistetter, and Grujicic. Only
the Finta case was completed at trial where he was acquitted,
and the decision was upheld by both the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal and the Supreme Court of Canada. (For trial decision, see
69 O.R. (2nd) 557 (Ont. H.C.); for the pre-trial motions, see 50
C.C.C. (3d) 236 (Ont. H.C.); for the Ontario Court of Appeal
decision, see 73 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (O.C.A.); for the Supreme Court
decision, see [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (S.C.C.)). There have been three
criminal prosecutions in Australia, namely the cases of
Berezovsky, Wagner, and Polyukhovich, none of which resulted
in a conviction; the decision of the High Court of Australia on
pre-trial motions in the last case can be found in 101 Australian
Law Reports 545 and 91 International Law Reports 1.
6. For Canada, see Canada’s War Crimes Program, Annual Report
1999-2000 at 8-9; for the U.S., see <http://www.us-israel.org/
jsource/holocaust/rosenbaum.html>.
7. See <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm>.
8. Canada ratified the icc Statute on July 7, 2000, as the fourteenth
country to do so (see <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
status.htm>).
9. See Colin Warbrick, Elena Martin Salgado, and Nicholas Good-
win, “The Pinochet Cases in the United Kingdom” in Yearbook
of International Humanitarian Law 2, 1999: 91-117.
10. See <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-
ii990524e.htm>.
11. As well, the Pinochet case is cited as inspiration to attempt to
bring the ex-dictator of Chad, Hissene Habre, to trial in Sen-
egal where he is living at the moment; see the Washington Post,
November 27, 2000, 3.
12. For instance by the Center for Justice & Accountability in San
Francisco, <http://www.impunity.org>.
13. For an overview of the various means of bringing war crimi-
nals to justice see Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals (New
York & London: MacMillan Press, 1999); for truth commissions,
see Human Rights Quarterly 16, 4: 597-675, articles by Priscilla
B. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Com-
parative Study,” and Mark Ensalaco, “Truth Commissions for
Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment.”
14. Apart from the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribu-
nals after the World War ii and the more recent Statutes of the
icty (see <http://www.un.org/icty>), ictr (<http://www
.ictr.org>) and icc (<http://un.org/law/icc>), there have also
been a number of international treaties that regulate the con-
duct during a war, including the prohibition against war crimes,
namely the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols of 1977; there are four Geneva Conventions: the Ge-
neva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva i);
the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea (Geneva ii); the Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Mem-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva iii); and the Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (Geneva iv). The text of the four Conventions can be
found in Schedules I to IV to the Geneva Conventions Act, R.S.C.
1985, Chapter G-3. The articles dealing with war crimes are ar-
ticles 50 (Geneva i), 51 (Geneva ii), 130 (Geneva iii), and 147
(Geneva iv) which is the most encompassing. The war crimes
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been supple-
mented by the 1977 Additional Protocol i, articles 11 and 85. For
a discussion of the post–World War ii case-law, see Rikhof, “War
Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and Immigration Law,” (1993)
19 Imm.L.R. (2nd) 18, at 30-46.
15. A number of other activities have also been the subject of in-
ternational treaties that ask parties who have signed these trea-
ties to criminalize the described behaviour in their national leg-
islation and to ensure that persons who have been involved in
that behaviour are either prosecuted or extradited to a country
that is willing to prosecute those persons. Examples of such
activities are the unlawful use of chemical weapons; incitement
of hate, based on racial discrimination; slavery; drug traffick-
ing on a large scale or with an international dimension; severe
pollution of coastlines; interference with submarine cables;
mercenarism; and acts against the safety of United Nations and
associated personnel. See Cheriff Bassiouni, Aut Dedere, Aut
Judicare (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), who sets
out twenty-four categories of such crimes in the table of con-
tents and on page 73. The difference is that genocide, terrorism,
organized crime, and torture have a higher profile internation-
ally in that they are either the subject of an enforcement mecha-
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nism (such as for genocide where the icty and ictr have put
perpetrators of this crime on trial), a monitoring system (such
as for torture where the uncat, the United Nations Committee
against Torture, is active) or of international co-operation, of-
ten under the auspices of the United Nations (terrorism and
organized crime). As both the Torture Convention and uncat
system are well known, they will not be further discussed in
this article.
16. The Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime
of Genocide was adopted by General Assembly Resolution and
opened for ratification in 1948. It came into force on January
12, 1951; Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
of May 28, 1951, on Reservations to the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Interna-
tional Court of Justice Reports (1951), at page 23.
17. Case ictr-96-4-I
18. The icty has issued one judgment so far in which genocide
had been charged (Jelisic, Case IT-95-10-T, December 14, 1999)
and the ictr four judgments, namely in the Akayesu case (Case
ictr-96-4-T, September 2, 1998); the Kayishema/Ruzindana case
(Case No. ictr-95-1-T, May 21, 1999); the Rutaganda case (ictr-
96-3-T, December 6, 1999); and the Musema case (Case ictr-
96-13-T, January 27, 2000).
19. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft (860 unts 105) and the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (974 unts 178).
20. The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Airports Serv-
ing International Civil Aviation (ilm, Volume xxvii, 627).
21. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomats
(1035 unts 168; ilm, Volume viii, 41).
22. The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1316
unts 206; ilm, Volume xviii, 1456).
23. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(ilm, Volume xviii, 1422).
24. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (ilm, Volume xxvii, 668) and
the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (ilm, Vol-
ume xxvii, 685).
25. un Doc. A/52/653, Annex; article 2 provides that “any person
commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if
that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, dis-
charges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into
or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a
public transportation system or an infrastructure facility: (a)
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (b)
with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place,
facility or system, where such destruction results or is likely to
result in major economic loss.” The terms State or government
facility, infrastructure facility, explosive or other lethal device, and
place of public use are defined in article 1.
26. unga Resolution 54/109. At the moment, work is being done to
prepare a Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Ter-
rorism (see A/AC.252/L3) and a comprehensive convention on
international terrorism (see un Doc. A/C.6/55/L.2).
27. There have been some attempts in Europe and the United States.
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1977
defines terrorism in article 1 as follows (<http://conventions
.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/090.htm>):
For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States,
none of the following offences shall be regarded as a politi-
cal offence or as an offence connected with a political of-
fence or as an offence inspired by political motives:
a. an offence within the scope of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at
The Hague on 16 December 1970;
b. an offence within the scope of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971;
c. a serious offence involving an attack against the life,
physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected
persons, including diplomatic agents;
d. an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hos-
tage or serious unlawful detention;
e. an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket,
automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use
endangers persons;
f. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or
participation as an accomplice of a person who com-
mits or attempts to commit such an offence.
In the U.K., the Terrorism Act, which came into force February
19,  2001 (<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/
pa/pabills.htm>) defines terrorism in section 1 as:
(1) The use or threat of action where (a) the action falls within
subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influ-
ence the government or to intimidate the public or a sec-
tion of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological
cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it (a) involves serious
violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to
property, (c) endangers a person’s life, (d) creates a seri-
ous risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or
seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2)
which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terror-
ism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
The U.S. defines this term in section 212(a)(3)(B)(ii) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (<http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/
graphics/lawsregs/ina.htm>) thus:
As used in this Act, the term “terrorist activity” means any
activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where
it is committed (or which, if committed in the United
States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United
States or any State) and which involves any of the follow-
ing:
(i) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (in-
cluding an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).
(ii) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, in-
jure, or continue to detain, another individual in or-
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der to compel a third person (including a governmen-
tal organization) to do or abstain from doing any act
as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of
the individual seized or detained.
(iii) A violent attack upon an internationally protected
person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18,
United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a per-
son.
(iv) An assassination.
(v) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear
weapon or device, or
(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere per-
sonal monetary gain), with intent to endanger,
directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to
property.
(vi) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the fore-
going.
28. ilm, volume xxx, page 1592/3.
29. A/RES/51/120 of January 16, 1997.
30. Although the Rome Statute or icc Statute was adopted on July
17, 1998, an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an In-
ternational Criminal Court had already been operating in 1995,
followed by a Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court between 1996 and 1998. This
latter Committee included in its 1996 report the following crimes
under the jurisdiction of an icc: international terrorism, apart-
heid, torture, hostage taking, illicit drug trafficking, attacks
against United Nations and associated personnel and serious
threats against the environment, apart from genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity (un Doc. A/51/22). A re-
port by this Committee during its meeting from March 16 to
April 3, 1998, still included other crimes such as terrorism, crimes
against United Nations and associated personnel and drug traf-
ficking (see un Doc. A/AC. 249/1998/CRP.8, pages 17/18). Even
before the two special committees started their work, the Inter-
national Law Commission had already been asked by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations in 1991 to work on a draft
statute for an International Criminal Court. The ilc obliged in
1994 and included in its draft an article 20, which purported to
give the court jurisdiction over two types of crimes, the first
being inherent jurisdiction crimes over existing crimes under
international law (such as genocide, aggression, serious viola-
tions of law and customs in armed conflict, and crimes against
humanity), the second being jurisdiction over a number of ex-
ceptionally serious crimes of international concern, namely ter-
rorist activities, war crimes, torture, apartheid, and drug traf-
ficking (See un Doc. A/CN.4/L.491/Rev.2 and General Assem-
bly Official Records, 49th Session, Supplement No. 10, pages
66/79, 145/146 and 439). Eventually only three crimes remained
within the icc’s jurisdiction: genocide, crimes against human-
ity and war crimes (articles 6-8 of the icc Statute), while the
door is left open to add the crime of aggression when a defini-
tion for that crime has been agreed upon (article 5.2 of the icc
Statute). The trial of two Libyan nationals in the Netherlands is
not being conducted by an international criminal court but by
a Scottish court, which has been transplanted to the Nether-
lands as result of an international compromise; it applies Scot-
tish law and procedure before Scottish judges (see <http://www
.law.gla.ac.uk/lockerbie/index.cfm>).
31. un Doc. E/Conf/88.
32. un Doc. GA/9822, which is the press release announcing it; un
Doc. A/RES/55/25 is the General Assembly Resolution; un Doc.
A/55/383 contains the Convention and its Protocols as appen-
dices.
33. Section 19(1)(c.2) reads, “persons who there are reasonable
grounds to believe are or were members of an organization that
there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was engaged in
activity that is part of a pattern of criminal activity planned
and organized by a number of persons acting in concert in fur-
therance of the commission of any offence under the Criminal
Code or Controlled Drugs and Substances Act that may be pun-
ishable by way of indictment or in the commission outside
Canada of an act or omission that, if committed in Canada,
would constitute such an offence, except persons who have sat-
isfied the Minister that their admission would not be detrimen-
tal to the national interest.”
34. Section 19(1)(e) says, “persons who there are reasonable grounds
to believe . . . (iii) will engage in terrorism, or (iv) are members
of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe
will . . . (C) engage in terrorism,” while section 19(1)(f) reads,
“(f) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe . . .
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37. “For the purposes of paragraph (1)(l), ‘senior members of or
senior officials in the service of a government’ means persons
who, by virtue of the position they hold or have held, are or
were able to exert a significant influence on the exercise of gov-
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(b) members of the cabinet or governing council;
(c) senior advisors to persons described in paragraph (a) or
(b);
(d) senior members of the public service;
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Exclusion Clause (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999) 287-
293.
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rorists activities, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity from having access to the refugee determination proc-
ess if the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is of the
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42. Sections 70(4)(b), 70(5), 70(6), and 77(3.01)(b), which prevent
access to the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration
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curity and war crimes (unless indirectly as a result of the issu-
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of the Immigration Regulations prevents a person from access-
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crime); section 11.4 of the Immigration Regulations provides the
process for landing under this program.
45. Section 53(1)(b), if the Minister is of the opinion that the refu-
gee constitutes a danger to the security of Canada. This section
does not apply to organized crime. The Minister balances the
risk that the person faces upon return to the country of origin
versus the danger to the security of Canada. Apart from this
section in the Immigration Act, persons can also invoke article 3
of the Torture Convention to prevent removal to their country
of origin. The process used in assessing such a claim is one of
the issues before the Supreme Court in the Suresh and Ahani
cases (see note 47).
46. Sections 39(2), 39(4), 40(1), 40.1(1), 40.1(7), 81(2)(a), and
81(2)(b). The protection of information provisions (sections
39(5), 40.1(5.1), 77(3.2), 81(1)(4), and 82.1(10)) are all congruent
with the substantive provisions re inadmissibility to which they
refer with the exception of section 82.1(10), of which section
19(1)(j) is not a part.
47. See the Inland Processing (ip) Manual, ch. 5, paras. 3.3, 6.5, 9.1,
9.7, and 9.12. Serious criminality is to be balanced against hu-
manitarian and compassionate considerations.
48. Terrorism is only one of the several other concepts related to
inadmissibility based on security grounds in the present Immi-
gration Act, such as 19(1)(e)(i), (ii), 19(1)(f)(i), 19(1)(g), or
19(1)(k), but this paper will not discuss these concepts, although
there is case-law regarding those provisions. Some of these cases,
such as Al Yamani ([1996] 1 F.C. 174 and imm-1919-98, March 9,
2000, and Moumdjian, A-1065-88, July 19, 1999), discuss prima-
rily whether the term subversion in 19(1)(e) and section 19(1)(g)
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2000). Section 19(1)(g) was found to be constitutional except
for one portion: the part that makes members of an organiza-
tion that is likely to engage in acts of violence inadmissible (Al
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